

DOI: 10.31857/S013038640011362-6

© 2020 г. **В. В. НАУМКИН**

РУССКИЙ ДИПЛОМАТ В КОНСУЛЬСТВЕ РОССИЙСКОЙ ИМПЕРИИ В ДЖИДДЕ

Наумкин Виталий Вячеславович — действительный член РАН, научный руководитель Института востоковедения РАН (Москва, Россия).

E-mail: director@ivran.ru

Researcher ID: R-9576-2019; ORCID: 0000-0001-9644-9862

Аннотация. Статья представляет собой исследование деятельности консульства Российской империи в Хиджазе — одном из арабийских вилайетов Османской империи через переписку секретаря консульства — С. В. Тухолки с Министерством иностранных дел и Императорским посольством в Константинополе в конце XIX — начале XX в. Рассматривается внутривластная ситуация в вилайете, где шла подковерная борьба между турецким вали — губернатором вилайета и «великим шерифом» — эмиром Мекки, а также между органами управления вилайета и бедуинскими племенами. Особое внимание уделено вопросам паломничества мусульман к местным святыням и роли консульства в обеспечении условий для пребывания в Хиджазе в сезон хаджа российских мусульман. Анализируется проект Тухолки по установлению контроля за хаджем и защите российских паломников от безжалостной эксплуатации, которой они подвергались в Хиджазе со стороны далилей (гидов), помощников далилей — вакилей и мутаваффов (лиц, сопровождающих паломников), плативших мзду мекканскому шерифу. А когда они умирали во время хаджа, их деньги присваивались далилиями, местными властями или спутниками умерших. Консульству же, как правило, было ничего не известно о смерти паломников. Среди мер, которые предлагал секретарь консульства, были формирование из паломников групп во главе со старостами, подотчетными консульству, использование для путешествия в Джидду исключительно русских судов, командирование в Хиджаз на время хаджа двух российских чиновников из числа мусульман, обеспечение возвращения паломников домой и т.д. Однако эти меры так и не были реализованы.

Ключевые слова: хадж, российская дипломатия, Османская империя, Хиджаз, чума, вали, шериф, Мекка.

V. V. Naumkin

Russian Diplomat at the Consulate of the Russian Empire in Jeddah

Vitaly Naumkin, President of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russia).

E-mail: director@ivran.ru

Researcher ID: R-9576-2019; ORCID: 0000-0001-9644-9862

Abstract. The article examines the diplomatic activities of the Russian Empire's Consulate in the Hejaz through the correspondence maintained by Consulate Secretary Sergey Tukholka with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Imperial Embassy in Istanbul in the late 19th — early 20th centuries. The author pays close attention to the internal political situation in the vilayet, where behind-the-scenes power struggle was underway between the Turkish Vali and the Emir of Mecca, as well as a strife between the vilayet authorities and Bedouin tribes. He also focuses on Muslim pilgrimage to

the local sanctuaries and the role played by the Consulate in ensuring conditions for the Russian Muslims to stay safely in the Hejaz during the Hajj season. The author analyzes the project developed by S. Tukholka to, first and foremost, protect the Russian pilgrims from the ruthless exploitation they were subjected to by the *dalils*, their *wakils* and *mutawwifs*, who paid a kickback to the Mecca Sharif. Moreover, if cases of pilgrims dying during the Hajj (mostly unknown to the Russian Consulate), their money was misappropriated by either the *dalils* or local authorities, or by those who accompanied the deceased. The measures suggested by the Secretary of the Russian Consulate included the formation of groups among the pilgrims, each headed by the group leader, who would be accountable to the Russian Consulate. It was also proposed (a) to use exclusively Russian vessels to travel to Jeddah and (b) to assign to two Russian officers from among the Muslim community the mission of going to Jeddah over the Hajj period and making sure that the pilgrims could return home safely. However, these measures were never brought about.

Keywords: Hajj, Russian diplomacy, Ottoman Empire, Hejaz, plague, Vali, Sharif, Mecca.

The ancient Russian town of Vyazniki, located on the right bank of the Klyazma River, 93 kilometers to the east of the city of Vladimir, with a great many churches and ages-old buildings, one of the linen weaving industry centers... Today, it is a regional center populated by only 35 thousand residents. Here, on 25 February 1874, a most unconventional Russian diplomat of the pre-revolutionary epoch, whose name was Sergey Vladimirovich Tukholka, was born. According to one version, his surname is a nickname of his family ancestor, who apparently happened to be a bricklayer, as the nickname is derived from the Bulgarian *tukhla*, which means a *brick*. According to another version, his surname is derived from a place named Tukhol¹ – a town in the Polish Pomerania (currently, the Kuyavian-Pomeranian province). In all probability, the family of the would-be diplomat moved to Vladimir, where in 1892 Sergey finished his high school with a silver medal and then became a student of the Oriental faculty of the St. Petersburg University. From today's perspective, we would be surprised to learn that the Albanian language, that was Tukholka's specialization, was taught just at the Oriental faculty. However, at that time, part of the Balkans still remained under the domination of the Ottoman Empire, and although, geographically, the region belonged to South-East Europe, politically, it was linked to the Middle East. Moreover, Albania was associated with the East by the mere fact that the greater part of its indigenous population had been Islamized, and moreover, Turkey viewed the Albanian Muslims as its backbone in the Balkans. As a matter of fact, the Consular Offices of the Russian Empire in that region were subordinate to the Imperial Consulate in Constantinople.

Sergey lived in St. Petersburg at No. 23 Marat Street (former Nikolayevskaya), which has been preserved until now and received the title of Tukholka's House. The house was built in 1830 and received its title, most probably, not later than in the 1840-s, when it was owned by Sofia Tukholka, who is described by Dmitry Sherikh² as “the widow of a mid-career civil servant”. Tukholka enrolled in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs service, where he quickly came into the spotlight, and in 1898 was commissioned as Secretary of the Russian Consulate to the West Arabian vilayet controlled by Turkey – the Hejaz located in the city of Jeddah.

The aim of this article is to determine the goals, objectives and tracks of the activities pursued by the Russian diplomacy in the Hejaz, on the basis of the bottom-up approach, i.e. through analyzing the content of communication sent “from bottom to top” by the Secretary of the Consulate of the Russian Empire in Jeddah. For the purpose of reference, a period, when Sergey Tukholka worked for the Consulate in this capacity from the late 19th century through the early 20th century, is singled out by the author.

The historiography for concentrating on this area of research – the functioning of the Russian Consulate in Jeddah – is very limited, although there is a lot of published material

¹ In the early 1920-s, the Tukhol vicinity was the location of a most sinister camp for the Red Army soldiers, where about 22,000 people died of hunger, cold and diseases.

² Шерих Д. Ю. По улице Марата. М. - СПб., 2004.

in Russian dealing with the cross-disciplinary issues, including the situation in the Hejaz, pilgrimage etc., however a review of the rich body of academic literature available is beyond the scope of this article, as it is not directly related to its subject. It should be specifically mentioned that Tukholka himself wrote an article entitled “Russian Muslims in the Hejaz”³ for the Collection of Consular Dispatches issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The article contains an abbreviated account of a report communicated by the diplomat to the Ministry. Nevertheless, the predominant part of the archive materials used herein is introduced into the scientific discourse for the first time. In 2018, the author released a monograph focusing on the later period – the Soviet Diplomacy in the Hejaz/Saudi Arabia in 1920 – 1930-s⁴, where the initial chapters touch upon the issues pertinent to the subject matter of the present article. Special attention is paid in the article to the role played by the personality factor in putting forward the foreign policies of the state (the Russian Empire).

The Russian Consulate was opened in the Hejaz in 1890. Despite the fact that the vilayet was too distant from the Russian boundaries, its political gravity was highly significant, as it was the location of the greatest sanctuaries of Islam, that attracted several thousands of pilgrims from across Russia and its Central Asian protectorates at the time of Hajj annually. The entry to the sacred Islamic cities – Mecca and Medina – was banned for non-Muslims, that is why neither Tukholka, nor the Russian Consul himself – Vladimir Vladimirovich von Zimmerman could see for themselves how the Hajj was actually performed. The entire vilayet was ruled by the Turkish governor – Vali, whereas the principal person in Mecca was the Emir, administratively subordinate to the Vali, a representative of the Hashemites – the lineage of Prophet Mohammed and his direct descendant, the “Great Sharif”, who, at the same time, was regarded as the supreme spiritual leader of all local Muslims. The city of Jeddah was ruled by the Kaymakam.

In Jeddah, the work of the diplomats was hindered not only by the ban to visit the holy cities, but also by the scorching heat and atrocious living and sanitary conditions. Nevertheless, Tukholka swiftly got into the swing of things and showed his ability to act as a professional in such challenging environment. His resourcefulness and brilliance were most conspicuously manifest in 1901 – 1903, when he acted as the Chargé d-Affaires of the Consulate, while von Zimmerman was away from office, and could forward his reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on his own, likewise to other government agencies and the Imperial Consulate in Constantinople, where the Ambassador’s post was held from 1897 through 1909 by the outstanding Russian diplomat and Orientalist Ivan Alexeyevich Zinoviev. By 1901, Tukholka had been promoted to the rank of titular counsellor (a civil rank of grade IX under the Table of Ranks, corresponding to the infantry rank of staff captain and cavalry captain). Let’s get down to some of the dispatches compiled by Tukholka that testify to his profound knowledge of the local environment, his ability to generalize from facts as well as his creative faculties.

THE CHARGÉ D-AFFAIRES SEEKS TO PROTECT THE RUSSIAN PILGRIMS

Back in 1900, von Zimmerman informed his superiors about the shortage of water in Jeddah and also about “the failure of efforts to make arrangements for the right water supply system because of the undermining actions accomplished by the tanker owners”⁵. This time around, Tukholka elaborated on the same aspect, vastly important for the assessment of the living conditions in the Hejaz. In June 1901, he wrote to the Imperial Ambassador in Constantinople that Jeddah, as before, was still supplied with water primarily from the tankers, whose owners at the

³ *Тухолка С.* Русские паломники в Хиджазе // Министерство иностранных дел. Сборник консульских донесений. Год четвертый, вып. VI, 1901. СПб., 1901.

⁴ *Наумкин В. В.* Несостоявшееся партнерство. Советская дипломатия в Саудовской Аравии между мировыми войнами. М., 2018.

⁵ Report dated 27 November 1895 // Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI). Fund Politarchive. Series 482. Dossier 771. Sheet 60Back.

time of the Hajj, “were squeezing the pilgrims dry in a most outrageous fashion during the Hajj by delivering the stored water at a very high price”⁶. Having said that, due to the poor maintenance of the tanks, the water was not sufficiently clean.

Yet the tankers were filled with water only in the rainy season. In the torrid season, as communicated by Tukholka, the water was extracted also from small wells or deep holes, called *houfra* in Arabic, which were dug outside the city, at a distance of an hour’s or an hour and a half’s ride, as the subterranean water was available in sufficient quantity only in the environs of Jeddah. The digging of holes and delivery of water required a lot of effort, that is why the water was sold at a very high price.

Nevertheless, even in the rainy years, there was never enough water for the pilgrims. Over the Hajj season, preceding the compilation of the dispatch, it did not rain a lot. Water was offered at 15 francs a ton, and was of a “very poor standard”⁷. The water supply renewable from the suburban *houfras* was available only in four tankers. The following year, the feast of ending the Hajj in the month of Dhu al-Hijjah — Eid al-Adha — coincided with the month of March, while rains fell in Jeddah mostly in November and December, so the pilgrims were destined to experience an even more acute water shortage crisis.

Earlier, as reported by the Russian diplomat, Jeddah was supplied with water from the Hamidiyyah water pipe that ran from the water reservoir located within 2 hours’ drive from the city. However, in 1901, this reservoir failed to provide any water at all: first, because it was damaged, and second, the level of water in the reservoir was not high enough.

Tukholka advised that in the late 1900, four “Norton” system artesian water wells were dug, but after a period of nine months, two of them were already out of service, and the other two could barely function at all. The diplomat noted that the strategy could have been more promising, if the pipes of greater diameter and good pumps had been supplied, and that its advantage was that the water supply sources were located inside the city itself.

Unexpectedly, the diplomat in his communication to the Ambassador gave recommendations that should have been addressed to the Turkish authorities: “It might seem desirable that the Turkish government would become aware of the problem of water supply to Jeddah”⁸. Tukholka even tried to persuade the American and French Consuls to jointly with him encourage the Turks “to install the right water supply system in Jeddah”, but all his efforts were in vain, as the Consuls believed that any improvement of the Hajj conditions was not in the interest of the European powers, and thought it appropriate to “take advantage of every opportunity in order to ban it or impose restrictions on it”. While being opposed to such a cynical approach, Tukholka, in an elegant and cautious manner pertinent to the diplomatic style of that period, made the following conclusion: “It seems to me that banning or imposing restrictions on the Hajj for the reason of inadequacies and misappropriations in the system of water supply in Jeddah is fraught with many inconveniences”⁹.

These considerations are indicative of the political stance held by Tukholka, who had his own view on how the Hejaz problem should be handled and how the Russian policies in relation to the region should be developed. Generally, it is worth noting that many Russian diplomats, who served in Jeddah, went far beyond the scope of their core responsibilities, often forwarding their somewhat audacious proposals concerning the Russian policies and compiling unusual, lengthy reports, for instance, dealing with the Hajj.

Protecting the pilgrims was high on the agenda for the Russian Consular mission. On 20 June 1901, Tukholka sent a report to the Ambassador in Constantinople and to the Director of the First Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Nikolay H. Hartwig “On the poor Russian pilgrims who were stranded in Jeddah”¹⁰. According to the data in possession of the Russian

⁶ 8 June 1901 // Ibid. Dossier 775. Sheet 7.

⁷ Ibid. Sheet 8.

⁸ Ibidem.

⁹ Ibid. Sheet 10.

¹⁰ Ibid. Fund Turkish Table. Series 502 «B». Dossier 3313. Sheet 9–10.

Consulate in Jeddah, after the Hajj, there were approximately 900 such pilgrims, who had no means for survival and were de facto doomed to starvation. In order to offer them some assistance, the manager of the Consulate affairs on 13 June organized "the free distribution of bread" on a daily basis for 50–60 persons, its cost was paid from the donations for charity purposes made in 1901. Naturally, the budget did not envisage such expenses, and this can hardly seem strange to us today. However, as Tukholka wrote, being thankful for that, the pilgrims while they were provided with bread, "raised their hands in a sign of worship and pronounced a blessing upon His Majesty the Emperor".

The Chargé d-Affaires lamented the fact that "the Hajj is underlined by the Pan-Islamism idea, and the Turkish authorities acted in accordance with that idea, making no difference among the Hajj pilgrims of various nationalities". This was in contradiction with the Russian stance: "For us, on the contrary, it is essential to sustain in our pilgrims the sense of their national identity, that is why I thought it useful to remind them that they have their own Consulate that stands ready to take care of them".

Meanwhile, the plight of those people was really devastating. High mortality rates were witnessed among them, there was no one to offer assistance, whereas the Consulate, obviously, could not support as many people. In Mecca, there were *tekiyah*, where our pilgrims were provided with food for free, but they had no money to get there. The Chargé d-Affaires wrote: "I persistently emphasize that we cannot leave our Muslims, who are pleading with us to bring them back home, without help in the Hejaz under any circumstances".

The Turkish government failed to provide a vessel to carry the desolate pilgrims to Istanbul. Tukholka believed it was critically important to ask the Turkish authorities to "carry out pilgrims free of charge" to the Turkish capital, while the Kaymakam offered his assistance in that matter to Tukholka. However, the problem lay in the non-availability of a vessel, so the diplomat suggested that the Sanitary Inspector should exert pressure on the Turkish government to make it provide the vessel. And upon arrival in the capital, it would be preferable, Tukholka wrote, "for them to be transported to Batum on a Russian vessel. Otherwise, it would appear that the Turkish government cared more about them, than their own national government. The costs incurred could be claimed from them afterwards". Tukholka "in a most respectful manner" requested assistance from the Ambassador so that the pilgrims were not left without help in Istanbul.

The ingenious diplomat not only asked for assistance to the pilgrims, but he also suggested a way of resolving the problem that hampered the operations of the Consulate and was detrimental to Russia's reputation. "To avert this, it might be expedient to establish a system of return tickets for the pilgrims, i.e. so that the vessels would take the pilgrims on board at the Russian ports and issue them tickets to Jeddah and backwards". Besides, he supposed it would be feasible to have the pilgrims, getting off in Jeddah, leave security deposits at the Russian Consulate. However, "1) under the current Hajj conditions, and with the present composition of the Consular mission, this is next to impossible, and 2) then it is necessary either to get them their security deposits back in the city of Yanbu or demand that all pilgrims should return to Jeddah, after visiting Medina". And another idea of the Chargé d-Affaires: allow the Consulate to incur expenses related to the return of the deprived pilgrims to their native country in such a way that the above expenses would be reimbursed by the pilgrims at the place of their residence, or in the event of their insolvency – by their communities. These communities should be admonished beforehand that they would bear the financial liability for "the return of deprived pilgrims from their community and they should make sure that such poor individuals do not leave the country on a Hajj pilgrimage".

TUKHOLKA SUBMITS A PROPOSAL TO REVIEW THE RUSSIAN POLICIES IN RELATION TO THE REGION

In his reports, Tukholka was not limited strictly to the range of practical issues. On 25 July 1901, in a secret dispatch to the Ambassador in Istanbul, or Constantinople, as the Turks allowed to still call it, he presented his views on the objectives facing the policy of the Russian

Empire in the Hejaz and along the Turkish track, in general. Taking advantage of the situation, when he was left in charge of the Consular Affairs, acting in lieu of the Consul, (other Secretaries in charge acted in the same vein, for that matter, e.g. Fedor Nikitnikov and Michael Nikolsky), he tried to capture the attention of his seniors by generating massive proposals and ideas. For a researcher of Russian policies in the region pertinent to that period, the considerations of the diplomat, involved in his career activities there, are undoubtedly of immense interest, the more so as they were based on a perfectly adequate evaluation of the local situation in the Hejaz.

Tukholka wrote about the dual task ahead: “1) to the extent possible, win away from Mecca the importance that it holds, but so far to make sure that its influence can in no way affect our Muslim territories in an unfavorable way, and 2) make sure that our Muslims do not fall victim during the Hajj to the acts of robbery, exploitation and poor sanitary conditions”¹¹. If the fulfillment of the second task seemed a hypothetically clear objective, then the first one gave rise to many questions, in particular, concerning by what means it could be realized. The dispatch originator attempted to provide an answer to that question, trusting that it was possible to achieve such goals not otherwise than through the medium of Turkey. While speculating on the “assumption of the opposite”, i.e. on the possibility to exert influence directly on “the Sharif of Mecca, the Arabs and Bedouins”, which would be tantamount to the assumption that the Hejaz could be annexed from Turkey, Tukholka wrote that “so far there is no indication that Turkey will be unable to retain the Hejaz”. But, even if this could occur, the Secretary believed that there were obstacles on the way to acquiring immediate control over the Hejaz, such as: “1) the Bedouin tribes are constantly engaged in the fight against each other, 2) the Arab element in the Hejaz is essentially the one that represents the root of Pan-Islamism, 3) in order to secure a truly effective influence, it is likely that that resorting to the military force might be mandatorily required”¹². In a similar situation, the powers would be obligated to act in joint effort, as none of them would allow the other one to gain power in the Hejaz (apparently, Russia and Britain are meant hereinabove); besides, each power who has Muslim subjects “would be much better off provided that no incitement of the Muslim fanaticism sentiments occurs against it”. The idea of sharing responsibility for the risky and perilous policies pursued with respect to other states was nothing new, of course.

The Secretary of the Consulate drew the following conclusion: the best of all would be for the Hejaz to remain in the hands of the Turks, as Russia had a possibility to bring influence to bear on Turkey in Constantinople. However, to achieve the goal, it was essential that Turkey itself could wield a sufficient scope of influence in the Hejaz, whereas, in point of fact, it was the anarchy and lawlessness that reigned there. This conclusion was substantiated by Tukholka with the following rationale: “the limits of power exercised by the Vali and the Sharif are not duly delineated; the Vali succumbs to the Sharif’s authority in all cases; the authorities and local residents bleed the pilgrims dry, while the Bedouins engage in robbery and plunder”¹³. The diplomat saw the way out in the scenario that the Turkish government would appoint an energetic and honest Vali in the Hejaz, and the Sharif would be subordinate to the Vali under penalty of being removed from his position, while the Bedouins would be brought to heel by the troops, and subsidies would be provided to them promptly and accurately.

These proposals should be also addressed to the Turkish government itself, although the realization of them would present a big problem to it. Nevertheless, the Russian diplomat was hopeful that his proposals would get a favorable reaction from his seniors, for the next step, contemplated by him as a requisite initiative, was the improvement of public services and utilities in the Hejaz to be carried out by Turkey, whereas this would entail the enhancement of the European influence. In particular, such measures as the construction of forts in Jeddah, the water supply system in Jeddah and Yanbu, launching of a telegraph service from Yanbu to Medina and a railway line from Jeddah to Mecca etc.

¹¹ Ibid. Fund Politarchive. 1901. Series 482. Dossier 775. Sheet 14.

¹² Ibid. Sheet 100Back.

¹³ Ibidem.

Turkey was expected to benefit from such improvements of the vilayet a lot. The dispatch originator considered that the implementation of his plan (Russia was supposed to induce Turkey to accept the plan, as envisioned by Tukholka) would not only serve to reduce the danger exuded by the Hejaz and keep Turkey satisfied, but also to defuse the threat that Turkey itself posed to the Russian Empire. The Hejaz Arabs were already burdened by the Turkish dominance, they saw "the bearers of European civilization in the Turks, hostile to the spirit of Islam". According to the plan advanced by the Russian diplomat, the Turks would strengthen their clout in the Hejaz and start implementing reforms there, as a result the Arabs "would grow even more resentful of the Turks, and consequently, the Turks might have more difficulty in making use of the Arab element for the purpose of consolidating its influence among the foreign Muslims"¹⁴.

The diplomat wrote that, as a result of the proposed measures, "the powers would cause Turkey to make Mecca and Medina open to the Europeans; then sanitary officials, entrepreneurs, agents, engineers, merchants etc. would set out to go there. The powers would appoint their consular representatives initially from the Muslims, then from the Christians. Thereafter: 1) Mecca would be considered defiled by the *giaours*, and would partially lose its significance for the Muslims; 2) the Hajj would run out of its peculiar fanatical character and might be tangibly reduced over time; 3) the consular representative would be unable to monitor the ideas of Pan-Islamism and would thus fail to give a timely warning against them to their governments"¹⁵. Today, these ideas might seem totally crazy, and admittedly, they were perceived as such at that time too, moreover, the *Chargé d-Affaires* could not fail to be aware of it either. However, he thought that he had fully grasped the frame of mind of his seniors, who were expected hence to appreciate his reasoning (regretfully, some of the diplomats are guided at times by the same conviction nowadays).

Notwithstanding his tremendous activity concerning the sending of dispatches to the Imperial Embassy in Constantinople, Tukholka did not succeed in winning over the favor of his seniors precisely for the reason that his proposals did not resonate well with the understanding of the Hejaz or the Turkish reality. However, the familiarization with the proposals filed by the Secretary of the Russian Consulate is very helpful in providing an insight into the way of thinking of Russian diplomats, who worked in the region at that time, as well as into the diversity of views regarding the goals and methods for the conduct of Russian policies in the Hejaz. The naïve project conceived by Tukholka, though out of touch with reality, was arrogantly entitled by him as "Spreading the European Civilization and Influence in the Hejaz through Turkey, but under the General Control of Powers".

TUKHOLKA REPORTS ON INFIGHTING IN THE VILAYET

Here is one more intriguing episode described in the dispatches of the Secretary. Close attention of the Russian diplomats was captured by the attack of the Bedouin tribesmen on the Vali of Hejaz. In June 1901, the Vali Ahmed Ratib Pasha set out from Mecca to his summer residence in Taif accompanied by a convoy with four small weapons. As was reported by Tukholka to the Imperial Ambassador in Constantinople on 1 July 1901, he was attacked by the Bedouins, who captured and carried away one weapon, having killed four soldiers and wounded one officer¹⁶.

It is vastly important for the diplomats not only to receive information on the episode, but also to make sense of such an extraordinary situation existing in the Hejaz, as exemplified by the episode. The conclusion they made was that "the local Bedouins basically never recognized and will never recognize the Turkish rule, and in their deserts this rule was not manifest in any way, moreover, they do not pay any duty". The Bedouins, Tukholka advised, accepted

¹⁴ Ibid. Sheet 101Back.

¹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁶ Ibid. Sheet 14.

only the authority of the local Sharif, that is why Ratib Pasha acted in all his deeds in full accord with him, and “both of them rob the local Hejaz residents and the pilgrims alike in a most unscrupulous way”¹⁷.

The fact that the Bedouins engaged heavily in plunder and robbery was explained by the Russian diplomat with the argument that the Sharif failed to give them money and bread that were owed to them (this was reported specifically by Tukholka in his dispatch dated 28 May 1901). It was rumored that the Sharif got his share from such plunder, while the Turkish authorities adopted a *laissez-faire* attitude while being more worried by the rebellion in Yemen and tensions in the Asir region. According to the data in possession of the Russian Consulate, the Bedouins were discontented with the intention of the Turkish government to install a telegraph communication facility and to build a railway line in the Hejaz. Tukholka's dispatch to the Imperial Ambassador in Constantinople dated 4 July 1901, a copy of which was forwarded to N.H. Hartwig, as usual, said that on that day, 200 Bedouins from the Harb tribe, riding 100 camels, approached the gates of Mecca very closely with the intention of seizing the camels standing there together with the goods being loaded on them. After a police squad arrived there, the Bedouins retreated. “The raids by Bedouin tribesmen are a common thing here, Tukholka commented, stating that he did not pay any particular attention to the fact.

The Consulate noted that the Sharif Awn Rafiq Pasha had been appointed to his post “in circumvention of persons who were much more eligible to it”¹⁸. He did not enjoy popularity with the Arabs, and there were several potential candidates to the post of the Sharif living in Constantinople, whose feasible appointment was contemplated by the Consulate and reported to the Ambassador earlier. Forecasting the possible changes in the local bodies of governance, without doubt, was within the scope of the Russian Consulate officers.

Although the personnel were small in number, the Consulate monitored the movement of troops in the Hejaz vilayet. A report dated 1 September 1901, said that a Turkish vessel carrying 850 soldiers on board arrived in Jeddah, 250 of them disembarked in Jeddah, and 600 set off on a voyage to Yemen¹⁹. Excluding the newly arrived troops, there were 5,000 – 6,000 soldiers in the Hejaz, *inter alia* 2 regiments, 600 men strong, the Jeddah small fortress had 4 garrison guns and 2 field guns of the most advanced design. In Mecca, Taif and small forts, the Turks had 12 infantry regiments, 3,000 – 3,500 men strong, in Medina – 4 regiments, 1,000 men strong, besides, there were 400 cavalymen in Mecca and Taif. The number of canons was estimated at 22 by the Consulate. The Sharif of Mecca possessed a 600-men-strong group of Bedouins at his disposal, and up to 80 men-strong personal guard service.

The *Chargé d'Affaires* also informed the Ambassador of the revolt instigated by the soldiers that began in the Hejaz on 30 September 1901. Out of 800 soldiers in the Jeddah garrison, 250 had already served for two years, but failed to get any salary for a whole year. A similar situation was in place in other cities of the Hejaz. The authorities had no money to pay them their salary or to send them home. On that day, 40 soldiers armed with rifles seized the market mosque and announced that they would not leave it until they were provided with their salary and sent back to their homes. Following this development, 500 soldiers from the Mecca garrison seized the Grand Kaaba Mosque, making the same demands²⁰.

On 11 September, the Consulate informed that the soldiers were still holding the Mosque. The *Kaymakam* of Jeddah revealed that to pay the salaries and send 1,800 soldiers home, who had served their full term, it was needed to have 20,000 Turkish liras, but there was no money in the treasury.

The express manifestation of the soldiers' dissatisfaction allowed the Bedouins to capitalize on the situation with a view to intensifying the acts of plunder and robbery, as a result the route from Mecca to Medina appeared to be completely blocked. The road from Jeddah to Mecca was

¹⁷ Ibid. Sheet 14Back.

¹⁸ Ibid. Sheet 15.

¹⁹ Ibid. Sheet 108.

²⁰ Ibid. Dossier 772. Sheet 111–111Back.

controlled by several Sheikhs. Tukholka thought that “all the interested powers might request from the Porte the introduction of good governance and order in the Hejaz”, whereas “the warning to ban the Hajj would produce an effect both on the Turkish government likewise on the authorities and residents of the Hejaz”. The Consulate was right in its assumption that the Porte did not possess the full amount of information about the Hejaz disturbances, “as both the Vali and the Sharif applied strong measures against whistleblowers”²¹.

Only on 7 November, the *Chargé d’Affaires* advised the Ambassador in Constantinople and Hartwig at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the soldiers had received their leave papers and agreed to return to their barracks in waiting for a Turkish ship due to take them back to their homes²².

SANITARY AND HYGIENE CONDITIONS IN THE HEJAZ AND ASSESSMENT OF CONSEQUENCES RELATED TO THE LACK OF CONTROL OVER PILGRIMAGE

The Consulate displayed a great interest in the sanitary and hygiene situation in the vilayet. Earlier, in his report from Jeddah No.106 dated 11 June 1900, von Zimmerman advised Zinoviev: “The measures aimed at restricting the Hajj pilgrimage in India this year gave rise to the hope of significant minimization of chances for the plaque infection to spread from there to Jeddah”²³. The Consul believed that insofar as the death rate in Jeddah had decreased overall and the hygiene situation had improved thanks to the efforts undertaken by the Sanitary Inspector Dr. Pampouras and the newly appointed Qaymaqam Ali Youmni Bay with a view to ensuring cleanliness in the streets and in homes, the city would not be afflicted by the plaque. However, when the pilgrims returned from Mecca on 10 April, the death rate was reported to be on the increase, and on 13 April, the first plaque-related lethal outcome was registered. The case concerned a local merchant, who had returned from Mecca, and from whom other people contracted the disease. The Consulate deemed it appropriate to inform St. Petersburg about the situation development in fulsome detail. The importance of the issue was linked to the participation of “Russian subjects” in the Hajj – the epidemic, if occurred as a result of infection penetration from the Hejaz, could well reach the Russian territory and the Central Asian regions under its protectorate – the Khanate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva. The names of those who contracted the plaque were also indicated, likewise all of the possible routes for the infection to reach Mecca and Jeddah, and the number of the sufferers, including those, who had been cured and those who had died, all such data was presented in tables compiled by the Consulate with the dates attached. Von Zimmerman supposed that the plaque had been brought into Mecca by the pilgrims from the Hadramaut region or Oman, or even was “smuggled into the vilayet” from India, he also mentioned other options in his report – it could have been brought here from Souakim or even from the Asir region. The Consul went on to describe in detail how the plaque patients were treated, positively evaluating the actions accomplished by Dr. Pampouras, the Consul even suggested that St. Petersburg should provide Dr. Pampouras with “funds required to improve the conditions of the hospital, which so far has existed in a most primitive way”. Out of a hundred persons afflicted by the plaque, as of late May, only 23 recovered. The total mortality among the pilgrims, who had returned from the Hajj, was 101 persons from 6 until 30 April, and 80 persons in May. However, the plaque was fairly quickly halted.

The Consul wrote: “On a final note of this report, may I draw the luminous attention of Your High Excellency to the expediency of rendering feasible support to the native Kaymakam and local Sanitary Inspector in their painstaking efforts and endeavors to maintain the city in cleanliness and to apply such measures as necessary”. Von Zimmerman noted with gratification that the streets of Jeddah were no longer littered with heaps of rubbish. He also informed about the death rate in the city associated with small pox, which was not too high: 28 cases in April and 29 in May.

²¹ Ibid. Sheet 112.

²² Ibid. Dossier 775. Sheet 118.

²³ Ibid. Fund in Constantinople. Series 517/2. Dossier 5310. Sheets 6-11.

On the other hand, the Russian diplomacy saw the threats for Russia arising in relation to the Hajj not only in the sanitary and epidemiological conditions in the Hejaz. Within this context, not without interest is a dispatch sent by Tukholka, in the absence of the Consul, about the same time, i.e. on 27 May 1901, to the First Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (a copy to the Imperial Ambassador in Constantinople) No.135. In his dispatch, Tukholka set forth a thoroughly developed and very ingenious plan for managing the pilgrimage conceived by him. The Chargé d-Affaires began his report with a disconcertingly straightforward conclusion, that might seem politically incorrect by present day criteria: "First of all, it seems to me that the pilgrimage accomplished by the Russian Muslims to Mecca is highly undesirable for Russia... as Muslims feel like full masters in the Hejaz and it gets across this idea to all Muslims. Mecca and Medina represent the centers of Islam, which due to the Hajj appear to be in constant liaison with all Muslims countries, whereas the religious and political disorders in those countries in most cases stem directly from the Hejaz"²⁴. There is no point in looking for an indication of some Islamophobia in this assertion: the question was raised within the context of maintaining the internal security in the vastly grown Russian Empire, which held itself responsible for protecting its subjects from any external threats. Taking care of the Muslims did not entail any hostile attitude towards Islam, as a religion, it is convincingly evidenced by the dispatches sent by the diplomats, with just a few exceptions. The authorities thought it was their duty to fend off the threats of public disturbances, that could be spread on the Muslims population, who were the Russian subjects, likewise the population of the protectorates under the European rule. The threat was perceived exclusively in Pan-Islamism, viewed as a tool for extending the political influence of foreign powers in Russia, whereas the Hejaz was seen as a source of dangerous indoctrination of the Russian Muslims through radical political ideas, which was linked to the machinations and intrigues of the Ottomans, hostile to Russia.

Tukholka was also of the opinion that the Hajj was not in the interests of the Russian Empire, from an economic point of view. First, it "pulled away Muslims from work for many months, and, second, the pilgrims exported a lot of money from Russia and left it in the Hejaz". Apart from that, "the pilgrims are exploited by everyone there, ranging from the Vali and the Sharif to the Bedouins". Therefore, the restrictive measures, were deemed to be necessitated not only by the considerations relating to the state security, but also by the care of the pilgrims and the responsibility to protect them from the exploitation.

What was meant was in no way concerned with the imposition of a direct ban, which was most likely fraught with disturbances. "The French Consul told me, Tukholka reported, that according to his information, the Hejaz Muslims, being discontented over the banning of the Hajj for the Algerians lasting for many consecutive years, had made arrangements to incite a public outrage in Algiers, and that the Sharif of Mecca had sent his emissaries there with this aim in view, and he would have succeeded in his plans, if the Hajj had not been permitted that same year". The diplomat arrived at the conclusion that banning the Hajj directly "seems precarious and insecure, as it could cause the Muslim fanaticism to enhance and provoke disturbances among them". And further on: "We should strive to restrict and suspect the Hajj through indirect measures, and, possibly, without breaching the rules of Islam".

It is apparent that Tukholka was well aware of the fact the Hajj was attributed to the "five key pillars of the Muslim religion, and that a Muslim was obliged to perform a Hajj pilgrimage to the Holy sites at least once in a lifetime (he was also aware of the existing practice to get the pilgrimage performed on behalf of a person who was unable to do that by another person). The emphasis was made on the protection of Muslims: "In order to minimize somehow the negative aspects of the Hajj (political influence exerted on the pilgrims and their economic exploitation), it is appropriate, to the extent possible, not to let the pilgrims get out of our control and our protection". The basic points under the Consul's project were, first, restricting the Hajj, and, second, "placing it under our control and protection".

²⁴ Ibid. Fund Turkish Table. Series 502-B. Dossier 3313. Sheet 1-7Back.

Within the framework of these two tracks, a package of measures was initiated. In connection with the plan to restrict the Hajj pilgrimage, the dispatch said as follows:

“1) Every year, a vast number of Hejaz representatives, predominantly *dalils* or *mutawwifs*, i.e. Hajj managers, set out on a journey to the Crimea, Kazan, our Middle Asia territories, Kokand, Bukhara with the aim of recruiting the pilgrims. They bring with them various sacred objects for Muslims to be sold and receive orders for *Badal-Hajj* (Hajj by proxy on behalf of another for money). These people are definitely vicious. For this reason, it would be preferable to curtail the right of Hejaz representatives to enter Russia in a similar manner as it is done with respect to foreign clergymen and to foreign Jews. Those Hejaz representatives, who have already arrived in Russia with the aim of propagating the Hajj, should be immediately ordered out of the country and sent abroad.

2) We should take advantage of every opportunity to impose a temporary ban on the Hajj or to restrict it by a certain number of Muslims. Banning the Hajj during the last plague epidemic proved that such measure was justifiable.

3) The Hajj should not be allowed more than once, as the Muslim religion does not lay an obligation to do it more often.

4) People younger than 21 years of age should not be allowed to undertake the Hajj pilgrimage. The necessity to leave the children behind at home may sometimes act as an impediment for the parents to go on the Hajj, or at least may force them to come back as soon as possible.

5) Going on the Hajj should be permitted only for those individuals, who carry at least rubles 400-500 with them, because the lesser amount is not enough to cover the travel expenses and other costs related to the Hajj. Apart from that, the Hajj pilgrims should provide for their families while they are away from home and pay all the fees incurred. It would be reasonable to require from them to pay a deposit in the event that they commit a breach of the Hajj regulations”.

The diplomat cited examples of what had happened to the pilgrims, who departed with rubles 100-150 in their pockets. From time to time, they may be taken on board the ship going from Constantinople to Jeddah for free. When they have no money to make a back trip, they have to stay in the Hejaz, suffering from starvation and begging the Consulate to send them back home. Some of them manage to travel to Constantinople by sea free of charge, others manage to reach Basra, still others die and remain here forever.

And further on:

“6) The Hajj duration should be possibly reduced, that is to say the pilgrims should be scheduled to leave Russia so that they would arrive in Mecca shortly before the Qurban-Bayram feast (9th day of Dhu al-Hijjah month), and then, after the Hajj pilgrims visit Medina, they should be required to return home without delay”.

Here, again, Tukholka gave examples of how many pilgrims had arrived in Mecca in the months of Sha‘ban and Ramadan. Those who arrived in the Hejaz before the 15th of Dhu al-Qa‘dah would, traditionally, go to Medina, and from there return to Mecca in time for Qurban-Bayram. Whereas, those who arrived after the 15th of Dhu al-qa‘dah, would usually wait for the festive day in Mecca and only afterwards would go to Medina. The majority preferred to visit Mecca beforehand. “For this reason, the manager of Consular Affairs believed, in view of unified Hajj organization, it would be advisable to allow all pilgrims to leave Russia so that they might arrive in Jeddah in late Dhu al-Qa‘dah, before the 1st of Dhu al-Hijjah”.

PROPOSALS TO ENHANCE CONTROL OVER THE HAJJ AND PROTECT THE PILGRIMS

The dispatch further concentrated on the feasible measures to “establish control over the Hajj and offer protection” — it was the second track of the actions proposed under Tukholka’s project.

It carried a most detailed description of the ruthless exploitation the Russian pilgrims were exposed to. It included acts of robbery on behalf of the *dalils*, their assistants — *vakils* and *mutawwifs*, who paid a hefty kickback to the Sharif of Mecca. The pilgrims were squeezed dry by

their accomplices in Constantinople, Alexandria and Suez. The pilgrims, who did not speak the languages, were sold the tickets at a price three times higher. In Jeddah, the pilgrims were accommodated at *tekiyahs* — armshouses, or in private homes, sometimes they gathered together, representing various nationalities, before leaving for Mecca, their number reached 10,000 persons, while on the way back from Mecca their number totaled up to 16,000 persons. They had to buy water at a very high price. They were forced to pay a high price to the camel owners (used to carry them to Mecca), who were in collusion with the *dalils*. In that year, because of the huge influx of pilgrims, just before the very festival, the price for a camel was as high as 27 mejids, whereas in the preceding years it was only 5 mejids. Part of that money settled down in the pockets of *dalils*, while the lion's share was appropriated to the Sharif, who, in his turn, had to share it with the Hejaz Vali Ahmed Ratib Pasha. As this corruption scheme was well-known to everyone, both the Sharif and the Vali earned the notorious reputation of “bribe takers and robbers”. They also levied additional fees on the pilgrims, for instance, in that year they collected fees for the construction of a railway line.

And when the pilgrims needed to go from Mecca to Medina, they were confronted with the choice of two ways: either directly for 12 days overland, or overland for 2 days to reach Jeddah, then 1 day by sea to get to Yanbu, and from there for 4–5 days overland to reach Medina. The first way was longer and more dangerous, as there was a risk of being attacked by the Bedouins, however, this one was more preferable for the Sharif and the Vali, and for this reason, the Sharif did everything to prevent the pilgrims from going to Jeddah under penalty of being fined. He even sent a detachment of his soldiers, with a total strength of 500–600 men, to safeguard the road to Jeddah, and to block the passage of pilgrims along this route. Only the pilgrims from Algeria, who started a rebellion, were allowed by the Vali to make use of the second way, as he got frightened by the arrival in Jeddah of the French military vessel “Infernet”.

The acts of robbery committed by the Bedouins were also put down by Tukholka to the Sharif, who was provided with money by the Turkish and Egyptian governments and got grain crops from them to be distributed among the tribes, but, as a matter of course, he delivered only a part of such provisions and the rest was retained for himself and shared subsequently with the Vali. The Bedouins could only “be rewarded through their robbery”. Some of the *dalils*, as asserted by the diplomat, were suspected of being in conspiracy with the robbers — the latter showed them the richest pilgrims, who were sometimes not only robbed, but even killed. Moreover, the *dalils* collected money from the pilgrims along the way, allegedly, to pay a ransom to the Bedouins, but kept all the money to themselves.

When the Russian pilgrims died during the Hajj, their money was seized by the *dalils*, by the local authorities, or by those who accompanied the deceased. The Consulate, as it happened in most cases, knew nothing about the death of pilgrims from Russia.

“In view of the above, Tukholka wrote, it is necessary to provide the Hajj with a solid organizational structure, inter alia to organize the Hajj pilgrims, so to speak, in a soldier-like manner, to appoint responsible chiefs among them and to direct the entire huge crowd of people in accordance with our instructions”.

With this aim in view, it was suggested to:

“1) Form separate groups made up of 20–25 persons from the pilgrims. Each group, to the extent possible, comprising pilgrims from the same region. Each group should be headed by a chief to be approved by the local authorities. The chief should have a list of all Hajj pilgrims in his group, and the amount of money they have. It is desirable, among other things, that the amount of money that each Hajj pilgrim has should be indicated in his passport also”.

It was expected that the chief would represent the interests of the group before the local authorities and submit a relevant report to the Consulate.

“2) Make it mandatory for all the Hajj pilgrims to travel to Jeddah by sea (that is, in fact, what they do now) and make sure that their trip is arranged exclusively with the use of Russian vessels”.

This was precisely the way chosen by the French, at the same time, the French vessels paid a security deposit with the French authorities, waited for the pilgrims returning from Mecca in Jeddah, then

carried them to Yanbu, waited for them returning from Medina and transported them back to Algeria. In that year, as was reported by overzealous Tukholka, within the period from 2 through 9 March, the French ships transported approximately 5,000 pilgrims, overall, the Qurban-Bayram began on 17 March, and the pilgrims started to return to Jeddah before 28 March, on 4 April the vessels were already in Yanbu, and around the 20 April, they set sail for Algeria. The entire voyage lasted for about 70 days, while the average sea fare was French francs 300.

It was assumed that during the epidemic the Russian government could easily introduce appropriate measures for its vessels and exercise control over the return of the pilgrims. It was proposed to solicit a peremptory directive from the Porte to the Hejaz Vali ordering him not to delay the pilgrims wishing to go to Mecca through Jeddah-Yanbu, and to make sure that they can safely return from Mecca to Jeddah.

“3) If the Hajj is organized with the use of Russian vessels, and the latter enter the port of Yanbu, it will be required to appoint a Consular agent in that city for the duration of the Hajj.

4) It is desirable to send a Consular agent (a Muslim) to Mecca and Medina for the duration of the Hajj also. First, his formal presence there will exert a powerful moral influence, and second, he will monitor the Hajj and defend the pilgrims. Here, the British Vice-Consul, a Muslim from India and a doctor by profession, has been to Mecca several times during the Hajj period, and although he came there under the disguise of a pilgrim, it did not prevent him from paying a visit to the Vali and discussing business matters with him”.

Additionally, Tukholka proposed to send “two loyal Muslim functionaries” from Russia to the Consulate, for example, from Russia’s Middle Asia territories, who would be commissioned by the Consulate to Mecca, Medina and Yanbu, while the Russian pilgrims stay there. Apart from the above, he also considered it expedient to send to the Consulate, for the duration of the Hajj, a secretary or Russian correspondence clerk, for example, from the Turkestan territory.

With a view to covering the extra expenses related to the introduction of such measures, the *Chargé d’Affairs* proposed either to apply “an additional Hajj tax” to the Muslims, or to levy a fee on the Hajj vessels or on the sea fare. The *Chargé d’Affairs* wrote: “While implementing the above measures, we might clearly need the Muslim spiritual leaders in Russia very much, as they should convey the idea to the Muslims that these measures are appropriate and accord with their religion”.

The recommendations made by Tukholka, including those that were perfectly reasonable, though some others were useless, quite understandably, could not be fully realized, although they did have a certain effect on the shaping of policies pursued by the Russian government in relation to the pilgrimage performed by the subjects of the Russian Empire and its Middle Asia Khanates to the Hejaz²⁵. Moreover, some of his dispatches, in this or that form, were periodically repeated subsequently in the dispatches compiled by other Russian diplomats who worked in the Hejaz.

IN THE BALKANS AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Although the primary focus of this article lies in reviewing the functions performed by the Secretary of the Russian Consulate Sergey Tukholka specifically in the Hejaz, we need to provide a brief overview of Tukholka’s diplomatic background, given our interest in the work of the diplomat over other stages of his career development. Having accomplished his mission in Jeddah successfully, Tukholka bid farewell to Arabia and accepted the new appointment – to serve as Vice-Consul in Prizren, the city inhabited predominantly by the Albanians in the Kosovo and Metohija province (the territory was the Kosovo vilayet then). Prizren was the center of the Prizren sanjak, which subsequently, after the First Balkan War was incorporated into Serbia in 1912. There Tukholka stayed up until 1906.

²⁵ Some recommendations by the diplomat were included in above article written by Tukholka for the Collection of Consular Dispatches issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Over the span of his long diplomatic career, Tukholka contrived to serve in the Middle East – as Secretary of the Consulate in Damascus, Syria, as Consul in Basrah, Iraq, as Consul General in Baghdad, Iraq, also in the Balkans – apart from Prizren, as “Commissar of the Great Powers” on the island of Crete, Greece, as Consul in Mitrovica, a municipality in Kosovo, Serbia, as General Consul in Skopje, Macedonia, and finally throughout 1913–1920, as Consul in Varna, Bulgaria. He was raised to the position of Actual State Counsellor (civil service rank of class IV under the Table of Ranks, corresponding to the rank of Major General in the Army and Rear Admiral in the Navy). He often wrote articles for the *Balance* magazine and the *Southern Word* newspaper. From 1920, Tukholka remained in immigration in Constantinople, where he defended the interests of the Russian refugees. From 1922 until his death in 1954, he lived in Paris, carried out translation jobs, wrote social and political essays, was a member of the “Jupiter” Russian Masonic Lodge.

Let’s take a very brief look at some aspects of his activities in the Balkans and the way they were publicly perceived.

While working for the Russian Consulates in the Balkan vilayets under the reign of the Ottoman Empire, he gained a solid reputation of the defender of Serbs. Yury Anshakov, a Slavic historian, writes that, when in the early 1900-s the question of transferring the Vice-Consul from Prizren to Bitola, Macedonia, was raised, the Serbian Orthodox community in Peja approached Ivan Alexeyevich Zinoviev with a request to retain Tukholka in Prizren, as he “had proved himself to be a true friend of the martyrs among the Serbian people; and our people see their real defender in him and a sincere fellow man”²⁶. Furthermore, while Tukholka was a highly qualified Albanist, he could easily maintain contacts with the local Albanian population. He was a fluent speaker of Albanian scholar, and even published in St. Petersburg “A Brief Guide to the Albanian Language”. He didn’t provoke the sense of bitter resentment among Albanian Muslims either in Prizren or later in Kosovska Mitrovica (the Kosovo vilayet of the Ottoman Empire), in contrast to some of his predecessors, for example, the prodigiously talented diplomat, polyglot, who had a perfect command of many Oriental and Western languages, Russian Consul in Mitrovica Grigory Stepanovich Shcherbina, fatally wounded on 18 March 1903, by the lance bombardier of the Turkish infantrymen, who took vengeance for the Albanian Muslims.

In Kosovska Mitrovica Tukholka was appointed the Russian Consul in the early 1907. From there, he persistently requested that urgent measures should be adopted to rescue the Serbs from the violent attacks made by the Albanian residents in the sanjaks of Ipek, Prizren and Prishtina, including such as the introduction of permanent state of martial law, complete disarmament of the Albanian residents and even, as a last ditch method, the introduction of an international military contingent²⁷.

Additionally, after the beginning of the 1908–1909 Young Turks Revolution, when the relations between the Serbs and Albanians in the vilayet and also the situation with the Serbs, in general, started to change for the better, Tukholka suggested that the European nations (there is a certain similarity between his earlier formulated ideas in the Hejaz on the delineation of responsibility between Russia and the Europeans) should either provide for complete disarmament of the Albanians in Old Serbia (the northern districts of the Kosovo vilayet) and submit the Albanians to their authority causing them to be fully obedient, or they should separate it from Turkey by reuniting it with Serbia and partly with Montenegro, or should set up an Albano-Serbian Kingdom. An option

²⁶ Serbian church-and-school community to I. A. Zinoviev. 28 September (11 October) 1903 // Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI). Fund Embassy in Constantinople. 1903. Dossier 2021. Sheet 291–293. Cited by: *Аншаков Ю. П.* Российская дипломатия о положении славянского населения Старой Сербии (1902–1912 гг.) // *Известия Самарского научного центра Российской академии наук*, 2014, т. 16, № 3, с. 176.

²⁷ Tukholka to Zinoviev. 7 (20) March 1908 // Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI). Fund Embassy in Constantinople. 1908. Dossier 2027. Sheets 45–46 Back. Cited by: *Аншаков Ю. П.* Указ. соч., с. 170–189.

was also suggested to segregate the territory of Old Serbia into an autonomous province involving the introduction of forces of the European nations²⁸ [cited by: Anshakov, 2014, pp.178–179]. As we can see, here, in his reports, the diplomat demonstrated the spirit of utter audacity and creativity, trying to conceive a scenario in relation to the key foreign policy issues for the Russian Empire and a broad spectrum of Russian relations with overseas states, including the world powers, just as it had occurred in the very beginning of his diplomatic career in Arabia.

Sergey V. Tukholka passed away on 3 December 1954. With the kind assistance of Vasily A. Kuznetsov, we found Tukholka's tomb at the Pantin cemetery near Paris, area 11, row 15, burial site 15. The tomb is in a horrible condition, the granite monument once installed there is damaged, above the tomb, the only one in the row, there is a blackthorn bush with sinister looking red flowers, as if reminiscent of the deceased person's fondness for mysticism. Two more persons were later buried in the same tomb – Tukholka's wife and son, who was in all probability the last offspring of the diplomat.

Библиография

Аншаков Ю. П. Российская дипломатия о положении славянского населения Старой Сербии (1902–1912 гг.) // Известия Самарского научного центра Российской академии наук, 2014, т. 16, № 3, с. 170–189.

Наумкин В. В. Несостоявшееся партнерство. Советская дипломатия в Саудовской Аравии между мировыми войнами. М., 2018.

Тухолка С. Русские паломники в Хиджазе // Министерство иностранных дел. Сборник консульских донесений. Год четвертый, вып. VI, 1901. СПб., 1901.

Шерих Д. Ю. По улице Марата. М. - СПб., 2004.

References

Anshakov Yu. P. Rossiiskaia diplomatiia o polozhenii slavianskogo naseleniia Staroi Cerbii (1902–1912 gg.) [Russian diplomats on the status of Slavic population of Old Serbia (1902–1912)] // Izvestiia Samarskogo nauchnogo tsentra Rossiiskoi akademii nauk, 2014, t. 16, № 3, s. 170–189. (In Russ.)

Naumkin V. V. Nesostoiavsheesia partnerstvo. Sovetskaia diplomatiia v Saudovskoi Aravii mezhdu mirovymi voynami [Failed partnership. Soviet diplomacy in Saudi Arabia between world wars]. Moskva, 2018. (In Russ.)

Sherikh D. Yu. Po ulitse Marata [Along Marat Street]. Moskva – Sankt-Peterburg. 2004. (In Russ.)

Tukholka S. Russkie palomniki v Khidzhaze [Russian Pilgrims in Hejaz] // Ministerstvo inostrannykh del. Sbornik konsul'skikh donesenii. God chetvertyi, vyp. VI, 1901. Sankt-Peterburg, 1901. (In Russ.)

²⁸ Tukolka to Zinoviev. 1 (14) October 1908 // Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AV-PRI). Fund Embassy in Constantinople. Dossier 2027. Sheets 174–175.